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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

ALLEN LLOYD,

District Court Case No.
081902148

:
Appellate Court No. 20090920

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated October 2, 2009. The
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree
felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(2). He was sentenced by the Honorable
Michael D. Lyon to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison, and the sentence was stayed and the Defendant was placed on probation
with a 30-day jail commitment. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS
THE EVIDENCE OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AS
VIOLATIVE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1
SECTION 14, AS WELL AS THE DEFENDANT'S 4TH
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a mixed question of fact and law. The
trial court's legal conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court's conclusion. The trial court's findings of fact should be
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. "[Qjuestions of law are
reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if
clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This issue was
preserved for appeal when the Defendant filed a motion to suppress and also
entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). (R. 070/2-4).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wan-ants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection (See Addendum
B.)
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Article 1 Section 14: [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Article I, Section 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by
express words they are declared to be otherwise.
Article I, Section 27. [Fundamental rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
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substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
§58-37-8(2) Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i)

for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order,
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;

§ 76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of
dangerous weapons by certain persons.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101; or
(iv) within the last 10 years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense
which if committed by an adult would have been a violent felony as
defined in Section 76-3-203.5.
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an
offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section
58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
4

(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the United
States.
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees,
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under
his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or
has under his custody or control:
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony;
§77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
§77-23-104. Written plan — Approval of magistrate. (See Addendum E)
§77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When notice of authority is
required as a prerequisite.
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of the officer's authority and purpose, there is no response or
the officer is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of the officer's authority and purpose, if the magistrate
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice.
§78-2a-3(2)(e). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over: appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant is charged in an information dated October 16, 2008, with
the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Purchase, Transfer, Possession or
Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a third-degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-503(3)(a); and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B.
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l). On November 12,
2008, the Defendant made an initial appearance and the information was read. On
February 5, 2009, the Defendant appeared for his preliminary hearing, and the
matter was set for trial for April 2, 2009. The defense filed a motion to suppress
evidence on March 5, 2009, and a hearing on the motion occurred on May 12,
2009. Oral arguments and a ruling was rendered from the bench on June 18, 2009.
Thereafter the Defendant entered into a plea negotiation on August 6, 2009,
pleading guilty to the possession of controlled substance, a third-degree felony,
with the dismissal of the other two counts, with the Defendant specifically
preserving his right to appeal the court's ruling on the suppression motion. The
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate tenn of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison. The prison tenn was suspended, and the Defendant was
placed on probation with a jail tenn of 30 days in jail as a condition of probation.
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The defendant began his 30-day jail term on September 24, 2009, and has been
released from jail.
This judgment and conviction was entered on October 2, 2009, and the
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on October 20, 2009.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about March 8, 2008, Officer Powers from the Ogden City Police
Department received a call regarding a green vehicle parked in a small parking lot
behind an apartment building in which the caller resided. The caller apparently
believed that the green vehicle was occupied by three people smoking drugs. (R.
178/7 and 31)
Officer Powers went to the address (370 - 28th Street), saw the vehicle and
approached the vehicle. (R. 178/8) Officer Powers did not see any of the three
occupants smoking. (R. 178/10) Officer Powers testified that he saw the
Defendant, Allen Lloyd, sitting behind the wheel and that he approached the
vehicle and could smell an odor of crack cocaine, which the officer testified
smelled like cat urine. (R. 178/10-11) On cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing, Officer Powers admitted that he did not observe any illegal activity; all he
could do was smell an odor of what he believed was burnt cocaine. (R. 178/24)
Officer Powers then testified at this point that he detained the Defendant,
and he was not free to leave. (R. 178/24) Officer Powers questioned the Defendant,
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asking him if there were any weapons or drugs in the vehicle, and the Defendant
replied that there was a gun under his seat. (R. 178/24) Officer Powers did not ask
the Defendant if he had a concealed weapons permit, and the officer also admitted
that he did not get consent to search the vehicle nor did he get permission to
retrieve the weapon. (R. 178/26) At that point, Officer Powers ordered the
Defendant out of his vehicle, and he searched for the gun. (R. 178/26) The gun was
located under the seat in a black bag. (R. 178/26) The gun was a .45-caliber, which
upon examination had bullets in the magazine but no bullets in the chamber. (R.
178/14) In addition to finding a firearm, Officer Powers also located a small, hard,
brown glasses case. (R. 178/13) Officer Powers opened the glass case without
permission from the Defendant while Defendant was in custody and in handcuffs.
(R. 178/14-15) Inside the glasses case, Officer Powers found contained therein two
dirty syringes. (R. 178/14) Officer Powers then placed the Defendant under arrest,
searched his person, and found a baggie which contained methamphetamine. (R.
178/16)
At a May 12, 2009, hearing, James Gaskill testified as an expert witness. (R.
179/4). His qualifications included working for the State Medical Examiner,
running the crime lab for Weber State University and attending hundreds of
trainings and seminars. (R. 179/5). He testified that he has worked on hundreds of
drug cases and has experience in the field totaling more than 30 years. (R. 179/6)
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Mr. Gaskill testified that in his experience in dealing with cocaine, there is no
particular kind of smell that you can identify. (R. 179/7) In addition, Mr. Gaskill
further testified that even when the substance is heated or vaporized it does not
emit any particular smell. (R. 179/11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This case stems from a citizen complaint of a possibility of some individuals
smoking drugs in a car parked in an apartment complex parking lot late at night.
The officer testified that he approached the vehicle, ordered the occupant to roll
down the window, and then smelled the odor of cat urine. Despite the fact that the
officer had no drug recognition training and had never been trained regarding the
smell of drugs, the officer concluded that the occupants had been smoking cocaine,
and asked the Defendant if he had any weapons. Upon the Defendant's truthful
affirmative acknowledgment that he had a gun in his car, the officer removed the
occupants, placed him in handcuffs, and search the car, finding not only the gun
mentioned by the Defendant, but opening a small glasses case and finding the
drugs in question. Based upon a solely subjective and later proved to be erroneous
belief that cocaine smells like cat urine, the officer escalated the stop to a level II
or level III and conducted a search either for weapons. The officer extended that
search beyond the scope by looking into the glasses case and finding the drugs.
Once the officer found the drugs, he then charged the Defendant with possession of
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controlled substance as well as possession of a gun by a restricted person based
solely upon the drugs found in the glasses case.
Prior to the search, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that
Defendant had committed any type of crime; and, therefore, according to
established case law the stop was in violation of Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Any evidence obtained after that constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and
should be excluded from evidence.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS
THE EVIDENCE OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AS
VIOLATIVE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1
SECTION 14, AS WELL AS THE DEFENDANT'S FOURTH
AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
During the Revolutionary War the colonies fought to become sovereign
states. After defeating the British they unified as a loose confederation, and several
years later strengthened that union by replacing their Articles of Confederation
with the United States Constitution. Under that constitution, the separate states
retained most political power while allowing the federal government supremacy
only in enumerated areas. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a federal gun control law that Congress
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lacked the power to create): "We start with first principles. The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.... As James Madison wrote,
'[t]he powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.'" Given the
political philosophy underlying our history, this Court must view our state, not as a
dependant subdivision of the national government, but a state with its own
distinctive constitutional laws.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long, 431 U.S. 1032
(1983) stated that if a state court decision is appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and the state court decision appears to be based on both federal and state law, but
the "adequacy and independence" of the state law ground is not clear, the U.S.
Supreme Court will assume that the state court decided as it did because it was
required to do so by federal law.
The Utah Constitution can protect rights to an extent that often goes
unrecognized. Until recent times, the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights largely
only restricted the federal government, not state governments. For most of the past
two centuries, the declarations of rights in state constitutions—declarations that
often included protections not listed in the Bill of Rights—provided the definitive
lists of rights that states knew they were obliged to respect. Lately, these
declarations of rights have been neglected. Since the Utah Constitution's
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Declaration of Rights protects a number of rights not mentioned in the U.S.
Constitution, it is essential for courts to look further than the U.S. Constitution and
give adequate attention to the Utah Constitution when applying the law and
making judicial decisions.
The Utah Supreme Court in American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006
UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235, recognized the difference between the U.S. Constitution
and the Utah Constitution and held:
Although this court has not addressed whether the Utah
Constitution protects nude dancing, prior cases provide guidance on
how the freedom of speech provisions of the Utah Constitution
should be interpreted. The scope of Utah's constitutional
protections "may be broader or narrower than" those offered by the
First Amendment, "depending on [our] state constitution's
language, history, and interpretation." Id.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized that the scope of Utah's Constitution
may differ from the U.S. Constitution. It has been established Utah values and
protects the privacy rights of the individual, even when Federal Courts do not.
In Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, | 14, 122 P.3d 506, (reversed 126 S.
Ct. 1943 (2006)), the First District Court of Brigham City held that evidence
obtained during a warrantless entry into a home was unlawful, and no
circumstances existed to justify officer's warrantless entry. Id. The State then
appealed to the Appellate Court which affirmed the trial court's decision. The
State was then granted certiorari review in the Utah Supreme Court, which
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likewise affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The State then took the issue to
the United States Supreme Court, in which all three of Utah's standing court
decisions were overturned.
It is apparent that Utah has a different standard than the Federal Courts when
it comes to protecting the privacy of its citizens. The court in Brigham City cited
State v. Brake, in which that court "concluded that Article I Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,
^jl5, 103P.3d699.
Furthermore, in Brigham City the Appellate Court discussed the history of
this state stating:
"we engaged in an ongoing and robust discussion over whether and
to what extent we should defer to the federal courts when called
upon to interpret provisions of our Declaration of Rights, which
parallel the federal Bill of Rights. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,
1234-42 (Utah 1996); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534-36 (Utah
1994); State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990). In
Anderson, we counseled against departing from the guidance from
federal courts except when "compelling circumstances" required it.
910 P.2d at 1235. To do otherwise would cause unnecessary
confusion and undercut the policy objective of giving clear direction
to judges and law enforcement officials. Id. Justice Stewart in his
concurrence cautioned against unquestioning fealty to federal
precedent on matters of individual liberty. Id. at 1240. He defended
his view by noting that "["tlhe framers of the Utah Constitution
necessarily intended that this Court should be both the ultimate and
final arbiter of the meaning of the provisions in the Utah Declaration
of Rights and the primary protector of individual liberties.'"
/d.(emphasis added).
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Utah courts have more recently recognized the different standard between
Utah and Federal law. The Supreme Court in State v. Tiedemann, 2007 WL
1856929, 7 (Utah) stated:
The fact that the state and federal constitutional language is identical
does not require a claimant to create some threshold for independent
analysis of the state language. This court, not the United States
Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah's
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we
owe federal law no more deference in that regard than we do sister
state interpretation of identical state language. See, e.g., State v.
Debooy, 2000 UT 32, f 12, 996 P.2d 546 (recognizing that Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment
contain identical language, but stating that the court "will not
hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where
doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's
citizens"). State v. Tiedemann, 2007 WL 1856929, *7 (Utah)
Because Utah values the rights of its state's citizens, it has been recognized
that the purpose of the federal system is to look first at state constitutional
principles, then federal. Id. It is part of the inherent logic of federalism that state
law be interpreted independently and prior to consideration of federal questions.
Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
Bait L.Rev. 379, 383-84 (1980); see also West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d
999, 1006 (Utah 1994). This is so because the State cannot, conceptually, deny
rights guaranteed by the federal constitution if the state action complained of is
unlawful as a matter of state law. Thus, if state statutes, rules, or constitutional
principles preclude the state action in question, there is no need to assess the
14

federal constitutionality of that action. See Linde, supra at 383. This analytical
approach is known as the "primacy model," West, 872 P.2d at 1005-07, and we
have endorsed it in a number of cases, see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-84
(Utah 1991) (addressing defendant's claim under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution before proceeding to his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution); Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm % 796 P.2d
1256, 1261 (Utah 1990) ("[I]f the challenged statute cannot withstand attack under
the state constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question."). State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 WL 1856929, *7 (Utah)
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the problem of interpreting law in
State v. Worwood, 2007 WL 1791238 (Utah). In that case, the court held that,
"When interpreting state constitutional provisions that are similar or identical to
those in the federal constitution, we encourage a primacy approach. Under the
primacy model, 'a state court looks first to state constitutional law, develops
independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when state
law is not dispositive.'" State v. Worwood, 2007 WL 1791238 (Utah).
The Utah Supreme Court and Appellate Court know the importance of
interpreting Utah law prior to federal law and again recognize the difference
between the protection granted under the Utah Constitution versus the Federal
Constitution's Fourth Amendment. "In developing an independent body of state
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search and seizure law, we have held that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth
Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. Worwood, 2007 WL
1791238 (Utah). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has held that courts must look at
multiple factors in examining how to interpret state law from federal law.
In construing the State constitution, the Utah Supreme Court has remarked
favorably about the analytical framework employed in State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233
(Vt. 1985) which suggests the use of four principal sources of analytical material:
(1) the history of the state constitution, (2) the textual construction of the
provision, (3) a comparison with decisions of other state's courts construing their
state constitutional provisions of similar or identical language, and (4) sociological
materials. Id. at 23637. See State v. Ear!, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("We cite
with approval the summary of scholarly commentary and analytic technique set
forth by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett"). The Jewett court
indicated that these four approaches should not be considered exclusive of any
other that an imaginative lawyer might offer, however. Jewett, 500 A.2d at 225,
227 & n.14, citing P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate - Theory of the Constitution 25
(1982) (describing six types of constitutional argument: the historical, the textual,
the doctrinal, the prudential, the structural, and the ethical). According to Bobbitt,
the historical argument examines the controversies, attitudes, and decisions of the
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period during which the constitutional provision at issue was proposed and
ratified. Id. at 7. The textual argument considers the present sense of the words of
the provision. Id. Structural arguments are "claims that a particular principle or
practical result is implicit in the structures of government and the relationships that
are created by the Constitution among citizens and governments." Id. The
prudential argument advances a particular doctrine according to the practical
wisdom of the courts. Id. The doctrinal argument "asserts principles derived from
precedent." Id. Finally, the ethical argument "relies on a characterization of
American institutions and the role within them of the American people in
attempting to legitimize judicial review of the constitutional provisions." Id. at 94.
When looking to the protection of an individual's privacy, we can compare
the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
That provision provides greater protection than the federal constitution
against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Larocco_, 794 P.2d 460, 46668 (Utah 1990) (VIN of parked car not subject to warrantless search under state
constitution); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 41 6-18 (Utah 1991) (depositor's
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bank records protected under state constitution); State v. DeBooy_, 996 P.2d 546
(Utah 2000) (stating "we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different
construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this
state's citizens.") (holding suspicionless traffic checkpoint invalid under state
constitution); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("Choosing to
give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be an
appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the federal
courts").
Looking at the history of the Utah State Constitution, in recent opinions the
Utah Supreme Court has suggested that interpretation of the Utah Constitution
may be greatly influenced by the historical events surrounding the drafting of the
Constitution. See e.g.., Society of Separatists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921
-29 (Utah 1993) (concluding that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic"
and examining events surrounding Utah's admission to statehood to interpret state
constitutional prohibition of expending public money to support religious
exercise).

Unfortunately, no direct legislative history is available concerning the decision to
include Article I, Section 14. Nevertheless, the intent of the drafters may be fairly
inferred from the historical context in which the provision was included. Members
18

of the 1895 Utah Constitutional Convention understood from first-hand experience
the necessity of adopting safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure.
Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seizure Antipolygamy Raids, 62 Utah Hist. Q. 316,
317 (1994) (hereafter "Panek"). Utah pioneers suffered persecution at the hands of
murderous mobs in Ohio and Illinois, fled the extermination order of Missouri's
Governor Boggs, and suffered more persecution in the Utah Territory from federal
marshals engaged in warrantless raids of their homes in search of polygamy-law
offenders. Kenneth R. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure
Jurisprudence under the Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L.
267 (1991) at 276. The Desert News recounted the warrantless Utah raids as
"outrages," "earned out without even a warrant giving the perpetrators the
authority [to search]." Panek, at 327 (quoting, Beret News, March 10, 1886); see
also Paul Wake, Rights, and Free Government: Do Utahns Remember, Rev. 661,
671 -91 (1996).
This early Utah problem with searches conducted without proper warrants
was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. DeBooy, 2002 UT 32, \ 14, 996
P.2d 546 wherein it stated:
This states' early settlers were themselves no strangers to the abuses
of general warrants. Underlying the abuse of the general warrant was
the perversion of the prosecutorial function from investigating
known crimes to investigating individuals for the purpose of finding
criminal behavior. A free society cannot tolerate such a practice. Id.
at 552.
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Justice Stewart also believed that hisior\ of the Utah Constitution provided a
basis for a heightened expectation of privacy. In his concurring opinio- in ^tatc v.
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protections of privacy oi its citizens against the type of repression that they had
experienced theretofore. The unique history of Tie Utah Constitution, therefore,
provides a basis for reaching different, more protectiv e decisions thv- v. onkl a
federal court coi istri ling tl le I ; oui th Amendment.
1 1 le : secoi id n lethod of a nalysis recon i n: lei ide d by 1:1 le I Ital i Supi ei i le Court is:

(Utah 1986). On its face, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is nearly
identical to Uic Fourth Amendment. The only textual difference between the two
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constitutional provisions is one of punctuation and grammar. Because of the close
textual similarity between the two constitutional provisions, the Utah Supreme
Court will not draw a distinction between the constitutional provisions based
merely upon a textual analysis. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah
1988).
Notwithstanding the textual similarity of the state and federal provisions, on
more than one occasion, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 14
provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. DeBooy,
2002 UT 32,1 21, 996 P.2d 546, the Utah Supreme Court held a traffic checkpoint
to be unlawful under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The court
distinguished a suspicionless roadblock upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) and stated that
Fourth Amendment precedent is persuasive, but not binding when Utah courts are
construing the Utah constitution. DeBooy, 996 P.2d at 551. The court noted that
although the Utah and federal constitutions search and seizure provisions "contain
identical language" . . . the court "will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a
different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of
this state's citizens." Id. at 549. Justice Durham stated that "multi-purpose, general
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decision-making. Article I, Section 27, states: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is essential to the security of individual rights ...."
Section 26 of Article I, is also important; it states: "The provisions of this
Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are
declared to be otherwise." Section 26 was relied on by the court in State v.
Thompson for finding protection of bank depositor's records. Thompson, 810 P.2d
at 416-18.
Among the most fundamental of fundamental principles is the sanctity of
the home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and cases cited therein.
Directly related to judicial enforcement of the above principles is the
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is principally designed to deter violations
of the Fourth Amendment. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). By
excluding evidence discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the rule
"compels respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way, by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217.
This Court has ruled that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the
Utah Constitution in the recent case of State v. Yount, 2008 UT App. 102, ^ 24, 182
P.3d 405. In that case the Court held "Thus, under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, the evidence obtained through the State's illegal subpoenas to the
Hospital must be suppressed unless an exception to the exclusionary rule applies."
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Analyzing Utah Statutes, we unci that
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Amendment

imposes no irreducible

requirement

of such suspicion,

") (emphasis

added).
I Uali i units have held that •.caiclies coiulik led in loLiiion of suae Mamie are
i mreasonable I "OJ exai i iple, by si .ati it e, police sei v ii ig a seai el. i vv arrant ma> enter a
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authorizes them to do so.
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When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into
any building..., the officer executing the warrant may use such force
as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that
the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were
given.
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-210.
In State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah court of appeals
held that where police violated this knock-and-announce statute by failing to knock
on the apartment door and announce their presence and authority, the marijuana
found in the defendant's apartment should have been suppressed. Id. at 407, 412.
Similarly, the successful appellant in State v. DeBooy, 2002 UT 32, f 14, 996
P.2d 546, relied on §77-7-15 and other state statutory analysis as grounds for
urging the court to reject the roadblock exception set forth in federal case Martinez
-Fuerte. On considering this issue, the court held unconstitutional under Article I
Section 14 the roadblock scheme at issue in that case. DeBooy. The opinion raised
two main concerns. First, the plan failed to provide guidelines as to what such a
search should entail or how it should be conducted, thus violating the very statute
authorizing roadblocks, Utah Code. Ann. §77-23-104(2)(b). Id. at 551-52. And
second, the court raised the concern that suspicionless roadblocks conflict with
"the general rule" that reasonable articulable suspicion is required. Id. at 549. The
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DeBooy

court held that, "Failure to employ the exclusionary ruie to such a blatant

violation of a statute would reduce Article I Section 14's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures to nothing more than a form of words. See
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this labyrinth often imperil both, the rights of itidi\ iduals ,iml lln1 niiegnn and

effectiveness of law enforcement." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271 -72 (Utah
1985).
Delegates to the Utah Constitutional Convention endured outrageous
warrantless raids of their homes and desired to include protection from that sort of
invasion in Utah's Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court has said that in fact the
Utah Constitution does provide greater protections than the federal constitution.
Moreover, the federal rule actually guarantees the right of police to make
warrantless intrusions in every case. What once was the "chief evil" becomes
judicially protected conduct. The rule should be clear that in Utah warrantless
entries require suppression. As the dissenting justices in Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533 (1988) indicated, the rule is subject to easy abuse and creates an
intolerable incentive for warrantless searches.
Applying the above-described federal and state constitutional provisions to
the factual situation in the case at hand we see a clear violation of both state and
federal constitutions. The officer in this case received an anonymous citizen
complaint of someone smoking drugs in a car in the dead of night. A reasonable
view of this complainant's call and his/her allegations would suggest that he/she
had no idea whether the individuals were smoking illegal drugs or totally legal
tobacco. The officer, in investigating the situation, approached the Defendant's
car; and according to his testimony he immediately escalated the stop to at least a
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level 2 encounter. At that point the Defendant was not free to leave, and was under
total control of the officer.

The officer, in fact, testified ihat he. .aon mereh
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In the recently decided case of State v. Parke, 2009 UT App. 50, the Utah
Court of Appeals overturned a conviction of an individual on the basis of an illegal
search and seizure. In that case the State (and presumably the officer) identified
four basic reasons for the detention and search of the defendant after he was pulled
over for a traffic violation as follows:
(1) Officer Anderson effectuated a traffic stop, and traffic stops are
inherently dangerous, .... (2) based on his previous experiences
when seeing such a movement [shrugging of shoulder and other
physical movement], Officer Anderson subjectively believed that
Parke may have been hiding a weapon or drugs in his waistband area
because of Parke's shoulder movement,... (3) Parke became
"somewhat agitated" and questioned Officer Anderson's order to
place his hands outside the vehicle, ...(4) according to Officer
Anderson, the area he patrolled was "very dangerous", (id at f 8)
The Utah Court of Appeals analyzed all of these supposed indicators and ruled that
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in possession
of drugs or weapons as follows:
1.

With regard to the first fact, while traffic stops are inherently
dangerous,... "[D]espite the danger that inheres in on-thestreet encounters and the need for police to act quickly for
their own safety, . . . Terry requires reasonable, individualized
suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted."
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-35 n.2 (1990). (id at %9)

2.

Turning to the second fact listed above, although Officer
Anderson believed Parke's shoulder movement indicated that
Parke may have been hiding a weapon or drugs in his
waistband—and only the former is relevant in considering the
propriety of a Terry frisk in any event—we conclude that this
belief was a "hunch" or an "inchoate suspicion," not a
"particular fact" or "particular inference" that justified the
29

protective frisk of Parke. A police officer's subjective belie' is
just one factor in t h - totality of ihe ci^. umsiances a n a K s ^ .-.nd
is jioi determinative of whether reasonable suspicion a c i ^ . l h
existed T h e I "-tab Supreme Court h:ts previously determined
that "!"m]ere furtive gestures of an occupam of an automobile
do not g i \ e rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal
activihf* State v. .SW//av.sv/\ ~7~vi : \2< ; : ^ - 2 . 1137 H u ah
l98Q).Vidat1f i m

3.

i h e third LL-. WL- m u r d e r is inat I'lii'kv oecame "somewuai
agitated"" and questioned Officer A n d e r s o n ' s order to place
both of Parke's bands outside the window. "When confronied
Willi a traffic slop, ii is not uncommon f^: -ir-w^*
'•».*
nervous and excited].]" (id at Tl 2)

4.

flic fourth lacl. that a slop occurs m a hiLh crime area, is a
factor in determining whether a protective frisk is warranted.
Sec State w Brake, 200-J [' I 95. \M \ <P V W GW. } Iowe\ ei\
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car, together with the supposed smell oi' burning cocaine which "smells like cat
urine". (R. 1 7 ^ / 1 '
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This claim of the odor of cocaine is in direct contravention of

a., - r u g experts, . ^ . u d n m tn^ I >clendant s expert, James Gaskill, w h o opines that
aitei I landlii ig tl lousai ids < >;i sai I ipk is < >i cocaii ie, he can state tl mt it has no smell.
(See attached Idler of ,I:iiue<; (iaskill \ddendiiui i >i hirtbeiTnoiw i! "• ' parhuilar
significance to note that in the suppression bennm- I )fficer Powers testified that he

had "not received training in drug recognition procedures"(R. 179/41), is "not a
drug recognition expert" (R. 179/41), and has never "been taught that cocaine has a
particular smell."(R. 179 pg41).
Despite the fact that the defense requested a suppression hearing, notified
the prosecution of the expert testimony of James Gaskill regarding the lack of
smell of cocaine, the prosecution, who has the burden of proof in a suppression
hearing failed to call any expert regarding any potential smell of cocaine. The
testimony of Prof. James Gaskill was therefore unrebutted.
Additionally, the standard utilized in the determination as to whether an
officer has probable cause to arrest is an objective one. "The validity of the
probable cause determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent,
reasonable, cautious police officer ... guided by his experience and training."'
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). This standard is identical to the
Federal standard as set forth in Devenpeck v. Alford 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct.
588, 593 - 594 (U.S.,2004) where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

Our cases make clear that an arresting officer's state of mind (except
for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable
cause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 116 S.Ct.
1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (reviewing cases); **594 Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (per
curiam). That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest
need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide
probable cause.
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In the present case, the objective information available to the officci simph *• '
not rise to the level which would allow probable cause for an arrest. This objective
analysis would not even support reasonable suspicion that a. crime had occurred.
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the Defendant mentions he has a gun i inder the seat which is retrieved ai id I b\ ind to
be in a legal1 condition. Ai:> action by the officer thereafter is in direct violation
of the Defendant's constitutional rights.
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the Utah and federal constitutional
guarantees, tm acijnaai i :vhe\e> iuai nis rights were violated, the officer went
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I J.C.A. 1953 § 76-10-505(1) Carrying loaded fireatm V. vehicle or on street:
Unless otherwise authorized by law,, a person rna) not carry a loaded firearnn(a) in
or on a vehicle;
U.C.A. 1953 ^ '6-iOoU:. When\v:a f K:, u.cm.u .„aueu
(i ; 1 or the purpose of this chapter. an\ pistol. revoKer. shotgun, ruie, oi oim.
weapon described in this part shall be deemed lo be loaded when there is an
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position.
U • i'i .loU ctnd revolvers shall also be deemed to he loaded when an unexpended
cartridge, shel: or project! ie is in a position whereb\ ihe manna! operation of any
mechanism one:.- would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile to be
fired.

beyond permissible steps in his search of the defendant's vehicle in-person, and
pursuant to long-standing case law the evidence should therefore be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests this court
reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, and remand
for further proceedings.
DATED this #? day of April 2010.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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iffJS——
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b
ALLEN SMITH LLOYD,\
MICHAEL D LYON
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DISTRICT^
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D
a
t
e
:
S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 2009
'TinT fi 0 n

?nnn

PRESENT
Clerk:
shannone
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): NEELEY, GLEN W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 19, 1945
Audio
Tape Number:
4D092409
Tape Count: 2:02-2:10
CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/06/2009 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and
represented by Glen Neeley.
Defense counsel represents that the defendant has an appointment
set to schedule surgery.
The Court is willing to impose the sentence today, but stay the
jail sentence until after the defendant has had surgery.
Defense counsel agrees to proceed today.
Defense counsel further addresses the Court.
The defendant answers the inquiries of the Court.
The State declines to address the Court.
The Court directs the defendant to obtain a letter from his
surgeon stating a reasonable period of convalescence.
The Court will make a determination as to when the defendant shall
report to the jail once the letter is received.

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

081902148

JD29901914
pages: 3
LLOYD,ALLEN SMITH

Ox
Page 1

Case N o : 081902148
Date:
Sep 24, 2009
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term, i s suspended.
SENTENCE J AIL
Based o n the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 30 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1
Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due
Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$ 555 . 0 u

$0.00
$268.51
$555,00
$555 0 0
$0
$268 51
$555, 00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 m o n t h ( s ) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 3 0 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 555.0 0 wl lich Includes the surcharge,
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
The defendant shall enter into an. agreement with the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its
terms and conditions.
The defendant shall report to the Depar t .mei it of Correct :ions ai id to
the court whenever required.
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary by AduJ t P r o b a U o n k
Parole, paying all costs,
The defendant shall not consume or possess any alcohol or illegal
drugs.
Page 2

Case No: 081902148
Date:
Sep 24, 2009
The defendant shall
the chief menu item
illegal drugs.
The defendant shall
Probation & Parole,

not frequent establishments where alcohol is
nor associate with persons using alcohol or
provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult
and pay all costs.

Date
D LYON
Court Judge

Page 3

(last)
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ADDENDUM B
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection

and

Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But Congress may
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in
aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss

or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be
held illegal and void.
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

MR. DAINES:

We'd like to call --- James Gaskill.

3

JAMES GASKILL,

4

being first duly sworn, testifies as follows:
MR. RICHARDS:

5
6

exclude the \witnesses at this point.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. DAINES:

9

Your Honor, I'd like to move to

All right.
If they want to do an exclusion, that's

fine.

10

Off:Leer Powers, can you sit up here , please?

11

THE COURT:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13

Go ahead, please.

BY MR. RICHARDS:

14

Q.

State your name, please.

15

A.

My name is James Gaskill.

16

Q.

And, Jim, what do you do for a living?

17

A.

I'm a retired emeritus professor from Weber State

18

University.

19

Q.

20

University?

21

A.

And how long did you teach at Weber State

Well, I still teach a little bit, biit I started

22

teaching in 1970, and I've pretty much continuously taught

23

since then.

24

Q.

And in what field have you taught?

25

A.

Criminal justice, specifically forensic science.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

Q.

And I want to lay a little background information in

that regard.

What kind of training did you receive in

forensics?
A.

Well, I started working for the State Medical

Examiner during my years in graduate school at the University
of Utah.

I graduated in the field of biology.

I worked for

the medical examiner as an investigative assistant.

Then I

went to the Santa Clara County Laboratory of Criminalistics
for a research associate training.
Then I began the crime lab for Weber State in 1972.
I've attended hundreds of seminars.

I was a member of the

American Academy of Forensic Science, the California
Association of Criminalists, the Northwest Association of
Forensic Science, and I've been to many, many of their
training sessions.

And I have also been to the F.B.I,

academy training in Quantico, Virginia.
Q.

Okay.

And as an operator of the crime lab at Weber

State University -- I guess college back then, but -originally but then university -- did you have occasion to do
analysis on various types of drugs?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Explain to the Court what your expertise is in this

area .
A.

Well, I was -- that was a main part of the

assignment at the laboratory.

Probably 70 percent of the

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

5

cases that were submitted to the laboratory which amounted to
thousands and thousands of cases were drug identification, so
I've b een trained in that.
years since 1970.

I've done it for these many, many

I've examined and identified thousands and

thousa nds of different submissions of controlled substances
and testified thousands of times.
Q.

And the vast majority of those testimonies, I guess,

on dru gs have been on behalf of the State.

Is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

That means you were called by the State.

A.

Called by the State, right.

Q.

Okay.

well.
A.

Lately you've been doing some defense work as

Is that correct?
Yes.

Well, I already did some.

We -- our -- our

policy was not to exclude, but when someone brought us
evidence, we analyzed it and reported on it.
Q.

Okay.

The -- at some point the crime lab was moved

from Weber State to the State Crime Lab.

Is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And since that time have you continued in your drug

analyst teaching?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you still have a lab at Weber State University?

A.

We have a teaching facility which includes

instruments necessary for that kind of work, yes.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

6

1
2

Q.

during the process of teaching students --

3

A.

4

Q.

5

A.

6

Q.

7
8

So drugs are analyzed there on a routine basis

Yes.
how to do that -Correct.
particular science.
Have you during the course of your career ever

analyzed cocaine?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And do you have any idea how many times?

11

A.

Hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of times.

12

Q.

During your analysis of cocaine, do you come in

13
14

contact at least (unintelligible) with the -A.

Well, as it's within a few inches of our face when

15

we do the analysis and we're moving it from the packaging and

16

putting it in the test tubes and putting into spot plates and

17

so, yeah, it's -- it's there.

18

Q.

Okay.

And specifically we're asking some questions

19

about cocaine and the smell of cocaine.

20

experience in dealing with cocaine, can you give a testimony

21

as to whether -- as to what kind of smell that exhumes?

22
23
24
25

A.

No.

In your vast

Doesn't have any particular kind of smell that

you can identify.
Q.

That's even when you're, like you've testified,

inches from the substance?

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

And during the course of your analysis of cocaine,

3

and I want to direct your attention specifically to cocaine,

4

do you ever have occasion to mix it with other substances and

5

preparations?

6
7
8
9

A.

in the course of the analysis.
Q.

12
13
14
15

Okay.

And so you testified that -- let me -- that's

a bad question.

10
11

Well, we mix it with various solvents and so forth

Normally how do you receive the cocaine, in what
physical substance?
A.

I mean is it liquid, solid?

Oh, cocaine is typically received in the crime

laboratory as a powder.
Q.

Okay.

Looks kind of like powdered sugar or

something of that nature?

16

A.

Yeah, it might even contain powdered sugar.

17

Q.

And you testified you smelled the cocaine on

18

numerous occasions in powdered substance and there's no smell

19

to cocaine.

20

A.

Sometimes -- sometimes there's a smell, but it's not

21

something that is in any way definitive or reliable.

22

know, may get various odors, primarily from the things that

23

it's been diluted with or perhaps something that is a residue

24

from an earlier processing procedure.

25

bottle of cocaine which we've had in our laboratory for many

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

You

But we have a standard

1

I years which is certified pure cocaine.

2

|

Q.

Okay.

3

I

A.

And we deal with that.

Every time we do a cocaine

4

test we have to compare it to a standard.

5

that bottle hundreds and hundreds of times, and there's no

6

smell to it that I've been able to detect that emanates from

7

the bottle, nor have any of my colleagues ever indicated to

8

me that they --

9

MR. DAINES:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. DAINES:

12
13
14
15

Q

Objection, Your Honor.

That's hearsay.

Thank you.

(BY MR. RICHARDS) Do you have a normal sense of

smell, to the best of your knowledge?
MR. DAINES:

Objection, Your Honor.

He would have

no way of knowing that.
MR. RICHARDS:

17

THE COURT:

I think

—

Your question is:

Is there a usual --

what did you say?

19

MR. DAINES:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

THE COURT:

22

opened

Sustained.

16

18

And so I've

Does he have a normal sense of smell.
Does he have

Just a minute.

—
I'm talking to

Mr. Richards.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. RICHARDS:

Does he have a normal sense of smell.

Oh, personally.
Personally.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

THE COURT:

1

I wonder how he would know that.

You

2

might as k -- you might want to rephrase it and see if there's

3

anything that is -- if he's ever had an injury or something

4

that wou Id interfere with what would be a normal smell

5

capacity

6

Q

(BY MR. RICHARDS) To the best of your knowledge,

7

have you ever had an injury that would affect your sense of

8

smell?

9

A.

No.

10

Q-

Any birth defect that would affect your sense of

11

smell?

12

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

13

Q.

Are you able to smell many substances?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

During your course in your -- as an analyst in the

16

lab, are you able to smell other substances?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Such as?

19

A.

Well, various solvents, for example, had no trouble

20

distinguishing between them.

21

Q-

Marijuana?

22

A.

Marijuana, certainly can smell that and lots of

23

smells that come from chemicals that come from some other

24

substances.

25

they're processed, the processing can leave a residue which

For example, amphetamines depending on how

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

10

1

is pretty easy to recognize.

2

don't -- never --

I smell that quiet well.

I

3

Q.

So you are able to smell things?

4

A.

I've never noticed that I had a worse sense of smell

5
6

than people around me.
Q.

Okay.

Now, normally -- getting back to the

7

question.

Normally you receive cocaine in a solid or in a

8

powdered substance.

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

Do you ever -- and you said you have liquified it in

11

certain testing procedures?

12

A.

We dissolve it in solvents for analysis purposes.

13

Q.

And during the dissolving process are you able to

14
15

smell the cocaine?
A.

No.

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. DAINES:

20

THE WITNESS:

Have you ever heated

it?

Yes.
Does it emit any smell when you burn it?
Careful here.
Burning it is probably the wrong term,

21

but when you heat it and vaporize it, it doesn't emit any

22

particular smell that I've ever noticed, and I've done that a

23

number of times.

24
25

Q

(BY MR. RICHARDS) Following up on that question, you

are familiar, are you not, Mr. Gaskill, as to how cocaine is

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

11

normally ingested?
A.

The most common ways I'm familiar with are --

Q.

What would that be?

A.

Well, the most common way is to inhale it through

the nose.
Q.

And how do they accomplish that?

A.

Put it on a smooth surface, make it into a sort of a

line, and sniff it up their nose through some kind of a
hollow tube.
Q.

As a powder?

A.

As a powder.

Q.

But they can also -- I've heard the term

smoking

cocaine.
MR. DAINES:

Objection, Your Honor.

for direct questions here.

We would ask

He's trying to lead.

Mr. Gaskill

is not answering the questions that are relevant in this
case, and now they're trying to lead him through it.
THE COURT:

Well, I think -- if I understood the

question, I think what he was going to say was -- was sort of
background and not necessarily -MR. DAINES:
THE COURT:

All right.
-- the question, so overruled at the

present time.
MR. RICHARDS:

I forgot the question now, so good

objection, Bill.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

12

1
2

Q

(BY MR. RICHARDS) Let me ask you, are there other

ways that cocaine is ingested?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And what would be those methods?

5

A.

Well, it is often injected.

It can be altered.

The

6

cocaine that we -- when we say cocaine then typically we are

7

referring to the hydrochloride salt form.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

It can be altered to remove that hydrochloride and

10

then it becomes a free base which is commonly called crack.

11

Crack is -- has a lower -- has a lower vaporizing point than

12

the salt form.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

And so they can heat that up and it vaporizes and

15

then they inhale the vapors and that's what they call smoking

16

crack.

17

we're not burning it.

18

vaporizes and then inhaling that through the use of what they

19

call a pipe which can be anything that -- a glass tube or

20

whatever.

ItTs not technically smoking like tobacco because
We're just simply heating it till it

21

Q.

So they vaporize it and then inhale the vapor.

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

And that would -- would that give off a

smell, to the best of your knowledge?
A.

None that I've ever smelled.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

13

MR. RICHARDS:

1
2

5
6

I think that's all the

questions I have.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

3
4

Okay.

BY MR. DAINES:
Q.

You've indicated that typically you think cocaine

appears in powder form.

7

A.

That's correct.

8

Q.

That's what you said.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

It's also injected.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

But it can be made into the crack form.

13

A.

That's right.

14

Q.

Have you ever burned crack cocaine?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Where?

17

A.

In the laboratory.

18

Q.

Over what?

19

A.

Over —

20

Q.

Yeah.

21

A.

I don't understand the question.

22

Q.

What do you need to burn crack cocaine?

23

A.

Simply on a watch glass or some -- not in a pipe so

24
25

Is that correct?

over what?

1

that -- no one inhaled it.
Q.

Not -~ and that is how -- I mean, you're as old as I

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

am.

Right, Jim?

2

A.

Well, i'm not sure if I'm as old as you are, Bill.

3

Q.

You're talking about injection and powder forms of a

4

drug which are now typically smoked in pipes.

5

don't you?

6

A.

Well, crack is smoked in pipes.

7

Q.

Right and --

8

A.

But certainly --

9

Q.

-- crack is a form of cocaine.

10

A.

It is a form of cocaine, correct.

11

Q.

Have you gone over with these lawyers behind me the

12

You know that,

kind of cocaine that was found in this car?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

You haven't been through them about the facts of the

15

I haven't seen any laboratory results.

case.

16

A.

Only very briefly.

17

Q.

Okay.

If I were to tell you that crack was being

18

smoked in a pipe in the car, that's different from what you

19

do in the lab.

20

A.

Isn't that correct?

Well, we don't smoke crack in the lab certainly.

21

have -- we have as demonstrations and as education for

22

ourselves actually made crack in our laboratory.

23

Q.

And do you burn it to where the fumes come up into

24

your face?

25

A.

Not significantly into our face, no.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

15

We

1

I

Q.

Exactly.

I would like to have done that in this

2

| court, but I realize thdt would be illegal because that would

3

| be an ingestion of an illegal substance, wouldn't it?
A.

Well, you're the attorney so --

Q.

Yeah.

5

|

6

I standard -- I mean, there is a sale -- smell that you can

7

smell.

8

A.

9

Okay.

Now, you've indicated there is a

What is that smell, do you know?
I have not detected anything -- any smell that I

would say this is consistent with cocaine.

10

Q.

But you have smelled the smell.

11

A.

I have from time to time detected an odor which was

12

from something other than cocaine in the mixture of cocaine.

13

Q.

14

A.

16

Q.

18

21

And I'm assuming that because it's not there on a

regular basis.

17

20

Or that you're assuming is from something

other than cocaine.

15

19

Okay.

But you are smelling cocaine when burned with

mixtures.
I

A.

I don't believe I'm smelling cocaine at all.

Q.

You're smelling something when mixed with something

else.

Correct?

22

A.

I'm smelling something.

23

Q.

And the -- and you're doing that on a controlled

24
25

basis m
A.

a laboratory.

Correct?

Yes.

Diane W. Flanagan, PPR
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1
2

Q.

Now I want to go out on the street.

Okay?

People

mix cocaine with other things, don't they?

3

A.

With numerous things.

4

Q.

Numerous things.

But there may be police officers

5

who work cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking on a nightly

6

basis who smell particular things that it's mixed with on a

7

regular basis.

8
9

A.

You can see that, can't you?

What I can -- what I can say is that they may smell

something on a regular basis, but that is not something that

10

I would as a scientist say is -- is definitive enough or

11

regular enough to say this is cocaine as opposed to the same

12

thing being mixed with non-cocaine or not being mixed with

13

anything.

14

Q.

15

What are the kids on the streets mixing their crack

cocaine with these days, the last two weeks?

16

A.

Oh, I don't know the last two weeks.

17

Q.

You don't know, do you?

18

A.

No.

Crack cocaine is -- they don't cut crack

19

cocaine like they do powder cocaine.

So what's there is a

20

residue from the -- from the original powder cocaine.

21

Q.

Or from a crack pipe --

22

A.

Well, it could --

23

Q.

-- being used?

24

A.

It could have been a crack pipe -- a residue from a

25

previous smoke, if you will, yeah.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

Q.

Right.

And so the officers who are regularly on the

2

street who are regularly finding cocaine and

3

and things of that nature may be smelling

4

different combinations every time they pick up coke and you

5

might not know that.

6

A.

methamphetamme

distinctive

Isn't that a fair statement, Jim?

I would question whether that smell is sufficiently

7

related to cocaine to be able to say with any certainty that

8

it's not m e t h a m p h e t a m m e , it's not bunk, bogus, something

9

that doesn't have any cocaine in it or simply a residue.

10

That's my problem --

11

Q.

That's fine.

12

A.

—

13

Q.

That answers my question.

with this.
Now let's go back

14

through, though.

15

not a lawyer so I don't expect you to know this -- as low as

16

the U.S. Supreme Court has defined reasonable, articulable

17

suspicion to be, that is not a level that scientists operate

18

on.

19

When you then overlay a level -- and you're

Fair statement, Mr. Gaskill?
A.

I think we probably operate on lots of levels, and I

20

don't know that we operate on probable cause or reasonable

21

suspicion or --

22

Q.

Exactly.

23

A.

-- beyond a reasonable doubt.

24

Q.

What you are trying to do is determine whether some

25

certain type of thing is a substance.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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Isn't that correct?

1

A.

Yeah, but we do that on various levels as well.

2

start with, for example, a color test.

3

bring the suspected cocaine into me, and I add to it a

4

mixture which is known to turn blue in the presence of

5

cocaine.

6

is perhaps cocaine.

7

also turn blue besides cocaine --

But there are other things that will

Q.

Exactly.

9

A.

-- so I have to proceed to --

10

Q.

Let's stop right there.

11

A.

-~ a higher level.

13

We bring the -- we

If it turns blue, then I have a suspicion that it

8

12

MR. RICHARDS:

Your Honor, I'm going to ask that he

be allowed to answer his question, that Mr. Daines --

14

MR. DAINES:

15

question right now.

16

at.

I don't think he's answering my
That is exactly the level I want to stop

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

THE COURT:

And I'd also --

That's not Mr. Richard's objection, if I

19

understand.

20

cut him off before he has finished his response.

21

I think what he is saying is that you tend to

MR. DAINES:

Well, the problem is he's then going to

22

a different level, and this is the level I would like to

23

interrogate him on.

24

THE COURT:

25

We

I understand, but out of courtesy to the

witness, let him finish, and then if you feel like he's not

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

responding, you can ask the Court to ask him to respond to

2

your questions.

3
4
5
6

MR. DAINES:
Q

Okay.

(BY MR. DAINES) Go ahead.

Tell us on what you've

been over this.
A.

So when I -- when I receive a blue color, I think,

7

well, there may be some cocaine there.

But it may be

8

something else that also reacts with cocaine -- or with --

9

with the cobalt thiocyanate.

And so I -- I would never

10

presume that that was cocaine simply because it turned blue.

11

Simply narrows down my option at this point, gives me a

12

direction to go m ,

but I would not --

13

Q.

Gives you a suspicion.

14

A.

-- call it cocaine.

15
16
17

good word at this point.
Q.

Exactly,

Thank you.

Okay.

The judge wants you to

keep going apparently.

18

A.

That's my answer.

19

Q.

Okay.

Good.

20

MR. DAINES:

21

witness, Your Honor.

22

Suspicion is probably a pretty

THE COURT:

I'm through.

All right.
I have no further questions of this

Let me ask a question.

23

mixed with other things?

24

pure unadulterated drug used in some fashion?

25

expensive that way?

Why is cocaine

Why isn't it just -- why isn't the

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056

Is it just too
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1

THE WITNESS:

Well, you can make a lot more money if

2

you sell -- if you buy an ounce and you -- and you dilute it

3

to two ounces, then can make nearly twice as much money.

4

THE COURT:

5

THE WITNESS:

6

THE COURT:

7

(Unintelligible) don't do it.
-- unsuspecting buyer doesn't know

THE WITNESS:
pure.

The buyer doesn't know whether it's

The buyer doesn't know even sometimes whether there's

10

any cocaine there or not.

11

with street drugs.

12

—

whether it's pure or whether it's --

8
9

Because the

THE COURT:

That's one of the real dangers

What often —

what kind of substances

13

would cocaine be mixed with in a form that might then be

14

smoked in a pipe or otherwise used?

15

THE WITNESS:

Well, they mix it with a lot of things

16

that are white:

Sugars, other cains, procaine, Novocain.

17

They mix it with anasatol.

18

different things, depending on where it's coming from and

19

what's available.

20

reasonably white and loose as a powder, then it will -- it

21

will work.

They mix it with lots of

As long as it comes out to be pretty

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

Thank you.

Any other questions?

(Unintelligible) follow up.

24
25

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

2
3

BY MR. RICHARDS:

4

Q.

If all of these substances -- let me back up.

5

You're aware of numerous different substances that people

6

have mixed cocaine with.

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

about it.

10
11

And you try to keep up on that as you teach

MR. DAINES:
He —

Objection, Your Honor.

he says he's not on the streets.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14
15
16

Q

That's leading.

It was a leading question.
It was.

I'll state it better.

(BY MR. RICHARDS) Why do you keep up on those things

that cocaine is cut with?
A.

Well, in a teaching mode I do it just so that I can

17

know what I'm talking about.

18

it sometimes for intelligence so that we could say, well,

19

this is perhaps related to other submissions.

20

where those submissions came from so we may be able to link

21

them up and show that they are a certain supplier or certain

22

area of supplier.

23
24
25

Q.

In the laboratory we would do

Then we know

And is there any particular cut smell that would

identify cocaine to you?
A.

No.

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

That's all the questions I have.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

3

BY MR.

4

Q.

DAINES:

But if there's a cut smell that individual officers

5

smell every time they find coke, that might create your

6

turning blue suspicion, is it cocaine if the officers don't

7

see that.

8

A.

9
10

Well, I just don't accept that as a -- as a

reasonable thesis.
Q.

If they're -- if every time they get cocaine they're

11

smelling a particular smell which might be a particular cut

12

but every time they find it they smell that, you don't think

13

that at least gives them a suspicion that there's cocaine?

14

A.

15
16

MR. RICHARDS:

19
20
21

Objection, Your Honor, he's asking

for a legal conclusion.

17
18

If you could --

MR. DAINES:
suspicion

He's already said that Mr. --

No.

He's the one who used the word

when cocaine turns blue.
MR. RICHARDS:

I didn't.

If he wants to let him talk about

legal standard, that's fine with me.
MR. DAINES:

I'm just trying to see what he will

22

deny here, Your Honor.

23

(unintelligible) behavior.

24

THE COURT:

25

THE WITNESS:

I'm in cross-examination.

Obviously

What do you mean by a cut of cocaine?
Cut is the thing they mix it with to

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR
(801) 395-1056
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James H. Gaskill
Consultant in Forensic Science
7909 S. 2100 E. Ogden, Utah 84405
801 4 7 9 - 5 2 7 9

March 5, 2009
Mr. Richards,
In a conversation yesterday, you asked me to express my opinion, based on years of drug testing,
regarding the odor of cocaine and the likelihood of a person recognizing its smell. I have handled literally
thousands of samples of cocaine, including samples that have been diluted, and pure pharmaceutical
samples. There is no specific odor that is discemable by my nose, nor by any of my friends and
associates in the forensic science field.
Cocaine can be processed or hidden with other chemicals that impart various odors, but none of
them are present on all, or even a majority, of samples. Various smells have been anecdotally attributed
to cocaine, but these smells are associated with other chemicals. I do not believe that any smell detected
by humans is a reliable indicator of cocaine.
Several years ago, a cocaine "smell" case was adjudicated in Federal Dist. Court in Salt Lake. I
testified in that case, but I cannot remember the name. You could ask Deirdre Gorman. She was the
defense attorney and will likely be able to give you a reference. You may also want to refer to a separate
federal case, U.S. vs. Juan Heriberto Carrillo, No. 93-50078, Ninth U.S. circuit 29 F.3rd 635.
Cocaine hydrochloride, the most common form, has a high boiling point and is not "smoked". The
form that is heated in a pipe is cocaine base, often called crack. No actual smoke is generated in this
process. The vaporized cocaine is inhaled.
If I can be of more assistance in this or other matters, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,

'&7m<7

JCJ^

James Gaskill, Forensic Consultant
Asst. Prof. Emeritus
Weber State University

ADDENDUM E

38

§77-23-104. Written plan — Approval of magistrate.
(1) An administrative traffic checkpoint may be established and operated upon
written authority of a magistrate.
(2) A magistrate may issue written authority to establish and operate an
administrative traffic checkpoint if:
(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a written plan signed by
the command level officer describing:
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and topographical
information;
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint;
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped;
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint, including the inspection or inquiry to be
conducted;
(v) the minimum number of personnel to be employed in operating the
checkpoint, including the rank of the officer or officers in charge at the scene;
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and other means of
informing approaching motorists that they must stop and directing them to the
place to stop;
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the establishment of the
checkpoint; and
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforcement officers operating the
checkpoint;
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that the plan
appropriately:
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed;
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry;
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will experience;
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the individual
enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement officers; and
(c) the administrative traffic checkpoint has the primary purpose of inspecting,
verifying, or detecting:
(i) drivers that may be under the influence of alcohol or drugs;
(ii) license plates, registration certificates, insurance certificates, or driver
licenses;
(iii) violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah; or
(iv) other circumstances that are specifically distinguishable by the magistrate
from a general interest in crime control.

(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan meets the requirements
of Subsection (2), the magistrate shall sign the authorization and issue it to the
command level officer, retaining a copy for the court's file.
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be issued to the checkpoint
command level officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint.
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint
shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in
the plan.
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available to exhibit a copy of
the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been stopped at the
checkpoint upon request of the motorist.

